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'OUR BROTHERS, 
OUR SISTERS, 
OUR SONS' * 
CONFIDENTIAL 
============ 
A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF 
RESISTANCE INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA 
Prepared for the 
PCR Commission Meeting 
by 
Robert Hislaire and 
Prexy Nesbitt 
July 1981 
* Tit~e taken from · a clandestine leaflet circulated 
inside South Africa in the early 1970s. 
,, 
PREFACE 
-__, __ 
The five years since June 1976 have seen a risi~ g 
level of popular struggle combined with an expanding 
campaign of armed action. 
The most visible and frequent form of resistance 
during the recent period has been action over specific 
grievances which are a direct effect of the apartheid 
system on people's lives ••• There have been widespread 
and sustained struggles on several fronts, often at an 
unprecedented level; struggles against the denial of 
trade union rights and low pay for black workers; 
against high and increasing rents and other housing 
costs; against crippling increases in the transport 
fares which black people have to pay to travel to the 
shops, factories and offices in "white areas" from the 
ghetto "townships" and "locations" in which they are 
forced to live; against inferior, racially segregated 
education; against forced removals and relocation of 
whole communities in both urban and rural areas. 
Few conclusions perhaps can be drawn about relations 
between underground political activity and the open 
political activity. All evidence indicates that the 
situation goes far beyond opposition only to specific 
or isolated effects of apartheid. · There is a clear 
demand for liberation and total eradication of the 
system, with widespread support for the armed struggle. 
(Developments in South Africa 
Since the Uprising of 1976, 
General Assembly, A/Conf. 107/3, 
20 April 1981, p.4} 
What seems to be happening in South Africa today is 
a process. It is one wherein slowly but steadily significant 
sectors of the South African people are becoming "the mountains" 
of the resistance inside the country. Today, three basic 
sources can be identified as jointly co~stituting the threat 
to the apartheid system: namely, 1) internal resistance by 
the oppressed; 2) the shifting balance of forces in South 
Africa; and 3) the growing strength of the international move-
ment to isolate South Africa. Of the three clearly the most 
· critical is the internal resistance struggle. This has been 
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long recognized. What is new is the accelerating rate at 
which the population is becoming more and more engaged. The 
late Amilcar Cabral perhaps best described it when he was 
chidingly told by a journalist at a ' London press conference 
in 1971 that the PAIGC could never win for Guinei Bissau did 
not have the proper terrain for guerilla struggle. Cabral 
answered patiently with the clear, calm style he had, "our 
. people are our mountains." 
Three movements have thus far been at the vortex 
of black resistance to the apartheid regime of South Africa: 
The African National Congress (ANC) and its associate organiza-
tion, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), the 
oldest liberation movement formed in 1912; the Pan African 
Congress of Azania (PAC), formed by Africanists having split 
from the ANC in 1959 over ideological questions; and finally 
various groups such as the South African Students' Organization 
(SASO) which had been led by Steve Biko and later banned, and 
today, AZAPO, the Azanian People's Organization, ASASCO, the 
Azanian Students' Organization and COSAS, the Congress of 
South African Students, all generally grouped under the generic 
banner of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). 
The purposes of this paper ar~ the following: 
(1) to examine each of the three major movements cited 
above in the light of concrete action taken against 
the racist regime of South Africa; 
(2) to attempt to delineate the amount of support each 
organization enjoys amongst the oppressed in South 
Africa; 
(3) to identify who endorses these organizations, whether 
interna1 1 ) or external participants and supporters; 
(4) and finally to ascertain the amount of media coverage 
each organization has been given in recent years. 
1) e.g., Bishop ~utu, General Secretary of the South African 
Council of Churches, in spite of the constraint of fue illegality 
of associating with, even quoting "banned organizations", has 
consistently worked with such ANC-related projects as the 
"Freedom Charter" and "Free Mandela" campaigns. 
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What is not attempted in the following pages is a 
systematic effort to examine the mechanism of opp ~essio~ and 
repression in South Africa. 
not permit such a discussion. 
Unfortunately, space and time do 
; ' Thus, the reader should bear 
in mind that serious description and commentary on the 
dialectic between repression and resistance - a critical 
component to fully perceiving the nature of resistance in 
· South Africa - is absent herein. 
Before any discussion of the three organizations' 
activities is undertaken, it might be beneficial to present 
a brief history of each of these movements. 
African National Congress 
The African National Congress came into being on 
January 8 1912, emerging from a coalition of intellectuals, 
peasants and workers. 2 ) Amongst its first demands were: one 
man one vote, land for the peasantry and freedom and unity for 
all of Africa. A year later, with the passing of the Land Act, 
the ANC sent a delegation to London asking for its suppression 
(the British government had the right to veto), a demand that 
was not met favorably. The 1920s and 1930s saw the increasing 
in numbers of the black working class due to growth in the 
South African economy, especially in the mining sector. 
Consequently, there were more and more attempts to establish 
black trade unions. This period saw as well the first major 
strikes led by a growing black labour movement. The struggle 
against the decision to withdraw suffrage rights from Cape 
Coloureds and Africans was . led by the ANC in the same period, 
and resulted in a compromise in which Africans were offered 
consultative representation. In the 1940s and 1950s,· the ANC 
increasingly showed its willingness to unite with all groups 
dedicated to the struggle against white supremacy. 
"The ANC's resistance to racially-based nationalism was 
stillfurther reinforced once it began to seek organiza-
tional alliances across tne colour line in the 1950s, 
2) "Colonialisme, Apartheid et luttes de liberation". Afrique 
du Sud-Namibie. Dernier trimestre 1977. pp. 26-27; Benson, 
Mary, The African Patriots, Faber and Faber, London, 1963 • 
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first with the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) 
and later with coloureds and anti-government whites. 
These alliances, made initially with the object of 
boosting the ANC's organizational capacity, eventually 
also had a profound effect on the shaping of African 
ideology, for once the ANC , had embraced the strategy 
of a multi-racial unitedfront, the adoption of a~J 
more racially exclusive creed became impossible." 
These new alliances were exemplified by the agreement 
between the ANC and the SAIC in July 1951 to form a Joint 
Planning Council for national campaign of civil disobedience, 
and in 1953-54, the establishment by the ANC of working rela-
tionships with the South African Coloured People's Organization 
and the South African Congress of Democra~s, the latter a 
white, mostly English-speaking organization. 
On June 26 1956, a year after the Congress of the 
People had been held, the Freedom Charter was adopted by the 
ANC. The Charter outlined the major political orientations 
the ANC's struggle was to take against the white South African 
regime, and it also stressed the ANC's commitment to a non-
racial ideology in which the fruits of South Africa were to 
he shared and enjoyed by all. Shortly after adoption of the 
Charter, 156 members of .the ANC were arrested under the 
accusation of high treason. The banning of the ANC (along 
with the PAC) was to follow, after the Sharpeville massacre 
of March 21 1960, under the Unlawful Organizatio~s Act of 
April 8 1960~ Following the bannings, the importance of 
armed struggle as a mode of political resistance began to 
emerge, as the previous policy of non-violence had failed to 
achieve any positive result for the oppressed, and in fact, 
the liberation movements' voices had been legally stifled. 
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 
The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania emerged as an 
independent organization in 1959, after a long debate within 
the ANC concerning the means and ideology that should be 
utilized in order to achieve the 1iberation of the racially 
3) Gail M. Gerhart. 
of an Ideology". 
"Black Power in South Africa. The Evolution 
University of California Press, 1978, p.101 . 
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oppressed. The Africanist fraction of the ANC, (before the 
split) which became increasingly strong in the ANC Youth~ League, 
rejected the idea that all anti-racist forces should be regrouped 
under one non-racial organization. , · The Africanists argued that 
it was necessary to bring together all Africans, since it was 
they, by birthright who possessed the land of South Africa, 
further they argued that the former colonialisers and other 
· ethnic minorities such as the Coloureds and Indians should be 
permitted to remain only on acceptance of the majority's terms. 
As the 1959 Africanist Inaugural Convention declared in its 
founding documents: 
"We aim politically, at government of the Africans by 
the Africans for the Africans, with everybody who owes 
his only loyalty to Africa, who is prepared to accept 
the democratic rule of an African majority, being 
regarded as an African. We guarantee no minority 
rights, because 4ye think in terms of individuals and 
not of groups." . . · 
Thus, it was necessary according to the ·PAC, to unify 
all Black Africans and only Black Africans under one political 
force and only then, from a position of strength, could discussion 
under the PAC's terms take place. White opponents to the South 
African regime were to be viewed with deep mistrust, as they, 
despite their fundamental disagreement with white supremacist 
policies, still continued to reap the benefits that white South 
Africa offered them. Consequently, the ANC's non-racial ideology 
was to be vehemently rejected. The formative viewpoint of PAC 
on white liberals was clearly stated in the same 1959 documents 
alluded to above. Speaking of the whites in the ANC they stat~d: 
"These 'leaders' consider South Africa and its wealth 
to belong to all who live in it, the alien dispossessors 
and the indigenous victims. They regard as equals the 
foreign master and his indigenous slave, the white 
exploiter and the African exploited, the foreign 
oppressor and the indigenous oppressed. They regard 
as brothers the subject Africans and their European 
overlords. They are too incredibly naive and too 
fantastically unrealistic .to see that the interests of 
the subject peoples who are criminally oppressed, ruth-
lessly exploited and unhumanly degraded, are in sharp 
4) "PAC in Perspective", pub-lished by the Mission to Europe and 
the Americas, PAC of Azania, London, England, 1973, pp.12-13 • 
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conflict and in pointed contradiction with those of 
the white ruling class." 
"The PAC recognizes the existence in South Africa of 
minority national groups d 'f European and Indian origin. 
Contrary to all other parties, we recognize the so-
called Coloureds as Africans. The tragedy of the South 
African political situation is that many allegedly pro-
gressive white intellectuals fail to outgrow the racist 
environment into which they are born and bred. As a 
result, they seek to infiltrate the liberation movement 
in order to shape its policy and programme in the image 
of their own intellectual wavering. They seek to import 
into the movement the racist antagonism of the white 
man against the Africans. This antagonism becomes 
particularly acute when the Africans refuse to serve 
the private political interests of the 'progressive' 
white man." 5) 
In March· 1960, eleven months after its formation, the 
PAC, under its Positive Action Campaign, called for mass civil 
disobedience throughout South Africa. Government reaction 
followed quickly in the shape of the Sharpeville and Langa 
massacres on March 21 1960, and the subsequent banning of both 
South African liberation movements. 
Throughout this period, the PAC continued to enjoy 
large support amongst the black masses as it had answered to 
the desire for action expressed by many Africans. Further, 
PAC had demonstrated that the apartheid regime wquld in fact 
use all means possible to crush any fdrm of black opposition, 
be it violent or non-violent. An increasing number of Africans 
identified with the PAC, as it stressed bold political action 
and the need for blacks to create a new identity for themselves 
without the interference of outside forces. 
The Black Consciousness Movement 
The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), relatively 
new when compared to the ANC and the PAC, 
"grew up through an increased realisation amongst black 
intellectuals of their own systematic exploitation and 
in reaction to white paternalism, but it was fuelled 
by resistance to the government-sponsored ideology of 
ethnicity that was used to justify the Bantustan programme."6) 
5) Ibid. p.15 and 16. 
6) "South Africa in the 1980s", published by CIIR, p.25. 
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Despite the international prominence given to the 
BCM during 1976 and the uprisings now called Soweto, the 
actual beginnings of the BCM can be traced to dates as early 
as July 1968 when at the then mixed ' Congress of the National 
Union of South African Students (NUSAS) Steve Biko and fellow 
black medical students drew aside to discuss their second 
class citizenship within the NUSAS. Another source of the 
, BCM is the struggle around the national question and the found-
ing of the PAC. A third source of the BCM from 1966 onwards 
was the "Black Theology" movement in the USA. 
From the beginning BCM was not one organization or 
one political movement. All indications are that the BCM 
never functioned as a formal federation or coalition. The 
"statement of principles" for the BCM was not written. It was 
a generalized mood of assertion, pride and anger that was its 
constitution. The BCM was a torrent of various organizations 
with two main constltuent groups constituting the BCM, namely, 
the South African Students Organization (SASO) and the Black 
People's Convention (BPC) with its related Black Communities 
Programme (BCP). Something of fue breadth and depth of the 
~ can be gleaned from the following partial listing of 
organizations and groups. 
A PARTIAL LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE BCM 
South African Students Organization (SASO) 
National Youth Organization (NYO) 
South African Students Movement (SASM) 
Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC) 
African Teachers Association of SA (ATASA) 
South African Black Scholars Association (SABSA) 
Association for Educational and Cultural Advanc~ment of 
Africans (ASSECA) 
Transvaal Labour Youth Organization 
Black People's Convention (BPC) 
Black Parents Federation (BPF) 
Black Parents Association (BPA) 
Soweto Parents Association (SPA) 
Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU) 
Union of Black Journalists (UBJ) 
People's Experimental Theatre · (PET) 
Housewives League 
Soweto African Traders Association 
•• I 8 
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Shebeen Owners Association 
Witwatersrand Taxi Association 
The Inter-Denominational African Ministers Association 
of SA (IDAMASA) 
The African Independent Churc6's Association (AICA) 
The Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) 
Unlike the ANC, whites were not permitted to join 
the different groups making up the BCM, but also differentiating 
, themselves from the PAC policy of POQO (we alone), the BCM 
brought together as 'Black', all minorities such as Coloureds 
and Indians who also suffered from racial oppression. 
Throughout, BCM spokespersons differentiated them-
selves from both ANC and PAC. As one spokesman said recently: 
"As to whether we will operate like the ANC or the 
PAC, the only difference in terms of ou~nvolvement 
~that the ANC and the PAC have opted for armed 
s~uggle as t~solution ~the problems of our 
country. We have always seen ourselves as an 
internal resistance movement, not only changing 
people psychologically, but also making them aware 
that they can do something physically." 7) 
Nonetheless, it can be said that the BCM has drawn 
its strength from two major factors. Firstly, the banning 
of the two major liberation movements in 1960 meant that 
there was no longer any ~gal organization that could represent 
Black demands within South Africa. There was a great need for 
an organization to fill in this vacuum. Secondly, and perhaps 
most importantly, the Soweto uprisings of 1976 and the 
government's reaction provided a large mass of youth and 
students open to BCM ideas, and thirsty for political action 
concerning existing realities and conditions within the town-
ships. Various BCM organizations of black youth were logical 
and available vehicles for these new waves of angry black 
youth. 
"Now after June 16 (1976 Soweto) the degree of political 
awareness has developed to such an extent that even 
eight-year olds understand what you mean by politics .•. 
7) "What is the Black Consciousness Movement of South Africa?", 
South African News Agency (SANA) BULLETIN, No.11, August 
1979, p.3. 
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Adults who were afraid to participate in politics in 
Soweto because of the number of people who have been 
killed have now realized that it does not really 
matter whether you fight or not, the regime still 
kills you. They accept that it is better to die 
fighting than just to be killed m your own house." 8) 
During the period that led up to the formation of the 
r PAC, the ANC can be said to have lost the initiative in the 
struggle for liberation. The ANC was in disarray following 
the arrest of many of its leaders, was unable to respond 
adequately to the changes that were taking place within white 
supremacist power structures, and was unable to answer 
effectively to the orthodox nationalism that was becoming 
prevalent amongst the majority of the African population. 
The ANC had not yet been able to analyse these changes and 
to propose a convincing alternative to the strong arguments 
for 'going it alone'. This is exemplified by the fact that 
it was the PAC that was largely responsible for most concrete 
action that was to take place during the period of its short 
legal existence. The PAC was merely, it claimed, putting into 
effect the 1949 ANC Youth League Programme of Action which 
called for new methods of struggle such as strikes, civil 
disobedience, boycotts, non-cooperation and open defiance of 
unjust laws. 
The confusion that the ANC found itself in is demons-
trated by Nelson Mandela's words, spoken during the Rivonia 
trial in 1962, where he was accused, along with other ANC 
members, of sabotage and conspiracy to overthrow the govern-
ment by revolution: 
"We of the ANC have always stood for a non-racial 
democracy, and we shrank from any action which might 
drive the races further apart than they already are. 
But the hard facts were that the 50 years of non-
violence had brought nothing but more and more re-
pressive legislation and fewer and fewer rights ... 
It is a fact that for a long time the people had been 
talking of violence - of the day when they would fight 
8) Speech given by Mr Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu BCM of South Africa 
to the Assembly of the IUEF held irt Geneva, November 22 1976, 
page 4. 
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the white man and win back their country - and we, 
the leaders of the ANC, had nevertheless always pre-
vailed upon them to--;;oid violence and to pursue 
peaceful methods. When some of us discussed this 
in May and June 1961, it ~~uld not be denied that our 
policy to achieve a non-racial state by non-violence 
had achieved nothing, and that our followers were 
beginning to lose confidence in this policy and were 
developing disturbing ideas of terrorism." 9) 
The purpose of this section on the ANC is to attempt 
to determine, through the examination of press clippings, 
whether the ANC after its relative loss of influence in the 
late 1950s and 1960s, has been able to emerge as an effective 
liberation movement, whether it has gained large internal 
and external support and finaliy, whether its political and 
military action has been effective in view of its objectives. 
In an interview given to 'Southern Africa' magazine, the ANC 
Secretary-General Alfred Ny o stated that the aims of the ANC 
today were as follows: 
"The aim, eventually, is to draw an armed people into 
the struggle. An armed people, developing around the 
core that has been set up - the people's army, Umkonto 
We Siwze - that is our aim. But in order to get our 
people to reach that situation you must get a people 
that is politically conscious now, to accept the 
inevitability of this form of struggle and that is 
what is happening in South Africa today. It is im-
possible to avoid the political mobilisation of the 
people, which in our view must form the firm and 
reliable base for the escalation of the military." 10) 
Has the ANC been able to work effectively towards 
th~ se aims? The authors of the recent Catholic Institute for 
International Relations' booklet, 'South Africa in the 1980s', 
argue that the ANC has successfully begun to carry out this 
plan and, since the June 1976 Soweto uprisings, more and more 
Africans have bee~ open to the ideas, methods and objectives 
of the ANC. 
9) "Nelson Mandela Speaks" South African Studies 4, pp. 89-90, 
published by Publicity and Information Bureau ANC-SA, London. 
lO)"A Voice for Liberation - ANC Leader Interviewed", Southern 
Africa, January/February 1981. 
../11 
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The ANC gained important new recruits in the 
wake of the 1976 police riots. No other movement 
is as geared to benefit from the labour militancy 
and student protest that now dominate black politics. 
Similarly, in its central ' 'policy statement, the Freedom 
Charter, the ANC put forward a programme for the whole 
nation appealing to a wide spectrum of opinion in 
its emphasis on democracy and egalitarianism." 11) 
Not only do the authors claim that the ANC has been 
gaining support due to the increasing militancy that emerged 
among Black youth in 1976, but they argue further that the 
ANC's socialist analysis of society -has also brought increased 
support amongst Black workers in important industrial areas. 
They argue that attempts to organize outside the usual trade 
union channels is providing more and more potential recruits 
for the ANC, and that activity carried out with success by 
the ANC has been a source of great joy in the industrial 
townships. 
The CIIR authors conclude that 
"(the ANC) finds itself today a strictly disciplined 
underground movement with a wide penumbra of 
sympathisers making preparations for guerilla war, 
a position assumed by them in the face of the in-
transigence of the South African government, after 
pursuing a policy of non-violent change for half a 
century." 12) 
Do press clippings justify the CIIR's conclusions or 
do they in fact demonstrate that this analysis has been too 
hasty? Press cuttings 13) seem to show a resurgence of ANC 
activity, both militarily and politically. Newspapers world-
wide have been giving increasing coverage to ANC activities 
carried out within South Africa, and of its diplomatic efforts 
abroad. Also, and perhaps most significantly, an examination 
of the world press seems to provide grounds for thinking that 
the apartheid government sees the African National Congress 
as the organization that is posing the most serious threa~ to 
11) Catholic Institute for International Relations, "South 
Africa in the 1980s", London, 1981, pp.33-34. 
12) Ibid. pp. 35-36. 
13) Press cuttings that have been used for the purpose of this 
report on the ANC, PAC and BCM, come from a period of 
approximately Gears, Le.~rom 1977 up to the present day • 
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the South African status quo. The South African Defence Forces 
have been stepping up attacks over recent years against alleged 
ANC members in neighbouring countr ~~s, or refugee camps in 
these same countries arid on military bases in Angola. A few 
examples of SADF activity in this sphere are the attack on ANC 
members in Swaziland in February 197814 ), the kidnapping of ANC 
official, Ndugu Victor Matlou whilst on his way to Maseru, 
' 15) Lesotho , and the attack by South African commandos on ANC 
refugee camps in Matola, Mozambique in which twelve people 
were killed. 16 ) 
On top of its military offensive against ANC centres 
and members, the South African government has stepped up its 
vocal attacks on the ANC and has at times in trials attempted 
to make an example of ANC militants in the hope that sympathisers 
might be discouraged from further activity within the organiza-
tion. The trial of three Blacks·in November 1980 accused of 
taking part in a raid on a South African police station, and 
sentenced to be hung, was reported in the Guardian in the 
following manner: 
"Observers here believe yesterday's death sentences 
reflect a general stiffening by the authorities of 
penalties for the growing insurgency in South Africa, 
much of which appears to have official or unofficial 
ANC sponsorship." 17) 
The head of the South African security police has also 
stated on various occasions that the ANC is increasingly viewed 
as the "largest terrorist organization" operating within South 
Africa 18 ) and that most guerilla activity taking place within 
the country was to be blamed on the ANC: 
"Brigadier Coetzee commented in the South African Star 
(newspaper) ~hat attempts by the banned Pan Africanist 
Congress at organized terrorism had little or no success. 
The ANC was another matter; it had far more sophisticated 
organizational structure and it was from its ranks that 
most of the terrorists active in South Africa in recent 
times had come.'" 19) 
14) Maputo radio report February 1978. 
15) Daily News (Tanzania) December 21, 1979. 
16) The Guardian (UK) February 7, 1981 . 
17) The Guardian (UK) November 27, 1980. 
18) Financial Mail December 19, 1980. 
19) Southern Africa January 1979 . • • I 13 
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The South African paper, the Rand Daily Mail reported 
that on April 21, 1981, Security Police headquartered at~Pretoria 
stated that 
- -
; ' 
"insurgents - believed to be infiltrators - had become 
more advanced and organized. The police further 
asserted that at the disposal of the insurgents were: 
A) a sophisticated system of underground shelters; 
B) elaborate hidden caches where weapons were stored 
and made ready for use only on the day of attack; 
C) a dead letterbox system of communications in which 
underground hidden postboxes were used for mes~ages, 
instructions, and money transfers. 
Additionally, the police claimed that since 1979 all 
incursions into South .Africa had been from Mozambique 
via Swaziland. 19i) 
Quentin Peel, until recently the British Financial 
Times correspondent in South Africa, has also corroborated the 
CIIR stipulation of ANC paramountcy stating in June this year: 
"Although the black community remains deeply divided, 
largely leaderless, and alienated, there is no doubt 
the multi-racial stance of the ANC is attracting in-
creasing support •.. Most recentbannings and detentions 
have been of activists showing signs of moving from the 
Black Consciousness camp to the ANC." 19ii) 
There is evidence as well to show that continuous 
attempts have been made by the apartheid government to discredit 
the ANC abroad, by continuously emphasizing the ANC relationship 
with the South African Communist Party. Louis L~ Grange, 
presently Minister of Police, claimed ~n October 10, 1979, 
that the ANC was merely a cover for the SACP in its fight for 
a Marxist---::-:volution in South Africa. 20 )~1 indications are 
that there will be an increased effort by South African Govern-
ment forces to attack the ANC by publicizing its alleged 
"communist"/Moscow domination. External and objective 
analysts, however, dispute these arguments and in fact cl~im 
that the SACP has been losing some of its influence in the ANC, 
due to the new flow of recruits the ANC has been attracting. 
The CIIR commentary previously cited states: 
19i) Rand Daily Mail (South Africa) ' April 21, 1981. 
19ii}Financial Times (UK) June 15, 1981. 
20) Focus on Political Repression in South Africa - News 
Bulletin of International Defense and Aid Fund. 
../14 
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"There is, indeed, no evidence to suggest that the SACP 
has any substantial presence in South Africa, whil_e __ 
ANC cells and sympathisers, local sources suggest, 
have recently been growing appreciably. The structure 
of the ANC, emerging int~ ~ 1980s, would be that of a 
popularMtionalist movement with a movement and 
leadership quite unlike the communist front organiza-
tion of whites' fears." . 21) 
In fact, the data itself seems to indicate that, 
rather than being a SACP front, the ANC itself is behind many 
organizations inside South Africa. 
this out asserting: 
The CIIR analysis points 
"It is safe to say that in all political or social 
groupings and associations, ANC members and sympathizers 
will be found pressing for a----;;rker orientation and 
pushing debate into the context of national liberation. 
While a small minority (of the ANC) will be committed 
communists many more will seek ~ationalism involving 
varying degrees of socialist transformation of society 
coupled with a strong element of state control." (page 36) 
This particular CIIR perspective has been further 
reinforced by recent repoits concerning a relative loss of 
influence of communist cadres within the ANC. Some commentators 
feel fuat this loss of influence is well demonstrated by the fact 
that Joe Slovo, a member of the SACP, and also for a long period 
head of the ANC military wing, is likely to see his military 
leadership role· taken away, and given to a younger Black 
activist, Thabo Mbeki. 22 ) 
"Many fresh ANC guerillas joined the movement not 
because theyeppreciated its views on dialectical 
_materialism, but because the ANC is widely considered 
in South Africa to be the onlyexile group currently 
capable of waging a guerilla war against Pretoria." 23) 
The second reason for the apartheid regime to continuously 
stress the ANC/SACP relationship, is the hope that it would 
discourage potential external support. Evidence shows, however, 
that contrary to the South African objective of isolating the 
ANC, the ANC has benefitted from increasing support in most 
African countries and has also made . headway in countries that 
· are relatively fearful of the spectre of communism. 
21) "South Africa in the 1980s", pp. 34-35. 
22) Africa Confidential, January 28, 1981. 
23) Ibid. 
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As of this moment, the ANC has offices in Nigeria, 
Algeria, Senegal, Egypt, Zambia, Tanzania and Angola. It has 
"representatives" in Botswana, Moz ~mbique, Lesotho, Swaziland 
and Zimbabwe. In 1979, the South African Minister of Justice 
claimed that the ANC received 4 million pounds in aid the year 
before from Eastern European and Scandinavian countries. He 
also claimed that the ANC was training guerillas during that 
same period in Botswana and Mozambique. 24 ) Though both these 
claims are difficult to verify, since the frontline states have 
continuously stressed that they could not permit AN_C military 
bases within their borders due to their vulnerability to South 
African military offensives, it is most probable that the ANC 
has indeed received large sums of money and has been getting, 
if not direct military aid, broad material support, offices 
and opportunities to express ANC views in those countries. 
Algeria, already actively supporting the Western 
Saharan liberation movement, allowed ANC to hold a conference 
in Algiers in 1979 25 ), in which the heads of the mission bureaux 
all over the world were brought together and analysed their 
work. In the beginning of 1980, ministers from Angola, 
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome met and 
26) 
vowed to give greater support to the ANC. 
What is clear is that ANC support is not limited to 
the frontline states but throughout Africa. Following the 
kidnapping of ANC member, Victor Matlou whilst on his way to 
Lesotho in December 1979, that same country protested energetically 
and eventually managed to secure his release. 27 ) In the first· 
half of 1980, the ANC's Freedom School opened in Tanzania in 
which children were to learn technical skills and in which 
d . 1 b d . . 1 · d 28 ) e ucation was a so to e geare to correcting racia attitu es. 
In June 1980 the West German Social Democrats welcomed ANC 
plans to establish an office in Bonn in these terms: 
24) . The Guardian (UK) May 7, 1979. , 
25) L'Afrique Democratique (France) September 1979. 
26) Daily News (Tanzania) January 29, 1980. 
27) Daily News (Tanzania) May 17, 1980. 
28) Anti-Apartheid News May 1980. • • I 16 
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"The Federal Government should give the ANC political 
assistance and also help it to overcome~reaucratic 
obstacles. Only in close cooperation with it can we 
find the best way for us to contribute to bringing an 
end to apartheid and to c r eating rule by a democrati-
cally legitimised majority." 29) 
Recently, after increasing allegations by the South 
African government that the ANC was using Zimbabwe for military 
• bases (denied by the ANC), Zimbabwean President Canaan Banana 
announced in September 1980 full governmental support of the 
ANc. 30 ) Perhaps one of the most significant breakthroughs for 
the ANC that year was the opening of the office in Dakhar, the 
31) 
capital of the pro-West and francophone Senegal. · Finally, 
most recently after the SADF raid on Matola, Mozambique, world-
wide condemnation quickly followed, 32 ) and Mozambique emphasized 
33) its renewed support for the ANC. 
"Condemnation of the attack continues. A number of 
speakers at the Non-Aligned Movement Conference in 
New Delhi have criticized the attack, as has the 
Organization of African Unity, the United Nations' 
Secretary General, Dr Waldheim, East and West Germany 
and the Association of West European Parliaments." 34) 
In short, the ANC seems to have been able to consolidate 
its effective foreign support in recent years. 
Within South Africa, it is difficult to ·measure the 
degree of support the ANC enjoys since it is illegal to 
support the two banned liberation movements. However, internal 
organizations and individuals, while not giving overt recognition 
of the ANC, have shown, on various occasions, that they do not 
negate its value. Consistently, inside many have come to the 
aid of ANC members facing prosecution or awaiting the enactment 
of death sentences. 
29) Sunday Post (South Africa) June 15, 1980. 
30) Sunday Post September 21, 1980. 
31) Africa News October 6, 1980. 
32) The Guardian (UK) February 12, ·.1981. 
33) Focus March/April 1981. 
34) The Guardian (UK) February 12, 1981. 
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Bishop Tutu, head of the South African Council of 
Churches, and well-known worldwide for his non-violent activism 
in the st~uggle against apartheid, stated within the context 
of the Pretoria 12 trial (May 1978) : · in which ANC members were 
being tried for conspiring to overthrow the government, that 
he was aware that 
"many people may strive to bring about change by peace-
ful means because it is what they are committed to; 
and I understand when others feel they have exhausted 
all avenues of non-violent means." 35) 
Bishop Tutu has also been actively supporting the 
campaign to free Nelson Mandela which is of great significance 
in view of the CIIR assertion that the ANC has a significant 
following inside South Africa: 
"While it is true that the South African government 
does try to divide and rule black political groups, 
the Mandela campaign, calling for the release of a 
man capable of unifying black political opinion, 
demonstrates how alert the Black community remains 
to such tactics." 36) 
The Methodist Church has also backed the appeals of 
South African Churches for a convention in which a just consti-
tution should be drafted. The appeal also demands that Nelson 
Mandela should, among other political prisoners, take part in 
h d f . f h 0 • • 3 7) t e rating o tis new constitution. 
After the Mat~la raid early this year, memorial 
services commorating the ANC dead were planned in many areas 
of South Africa, but all were banned by the government. The 
areas in which services were planned and thus affected by the 
ban were: Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town, Bellville, Goodwood, 
' Wynberg, Simonstown, Kuils River and Stellanboch. 38 ) 2 
--Gaster Buthelezi, leader of Inkatha, has tried on 
various occasions to woo the ANC into talks with his organization, 
claiming that he is not against the objectives of the ANC per se. 39 ) 
35) Focus No. 16, May 1978. 
36) "South Africa in the 1980s" p. 37. 
37) The Guardian, June 11, 1980. 
38) Rand Daily Mail, February 19, 1981. 
39) Rand Daily Mail, October 21, 1980. 
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It is difficult to verify whether talks have in fact taken 
place, as Buthelezi has claimed, since the ANC has been 
reluctant to comment on various of Buthelezi's claims to having 
a relationship with the ANc. 40 ) N: ~ertheless, Buthelezi's 
attempts to negotiate with the ANC amount to an acknowledgement 
that the ANC is, in Inkatha's eyes, the main external 
(external/internal?) force that must be contended with. 
White South African newspapers have also discussed 
the banned liberation movements, with particular reference to 
an eventual change of their illegal status. The editor of the 
Afrikaan's daily "Beeld", called for the government to sit at 
a conference table with the ANC, since he asserted that it 
had the support of millions inside South Africa. 41 ) The 
Rand Daily Mail also commented on the editor's stance and 
published a long article of its own, calling for an end to the 
bannings. Two important themes emerge from this article. 
Firstly, that the Beeld editorial by not mentioning the ANC's 
rival, "amounts to an implicit concession that the ANC is the 
main Black liberation movement in South Africa. 1142 ) Secondly, 
the Rand Daily Mail claims that "the ANC is that much closer 
to being regarded and treated as a viable alternative govern-
ment.1143) These articles are significant in the sense that 
they give the ANC a certain legitimacy and put pressure on the 
government to take up the challenge of · the liberation movements 
in a different manner than increased repression, the latter 
being a method which has consistently failed to discourage 
or eradicate popular support. 
Popular support for the ANC, judging from the amount 
of trials and guerilla attacks in which ANC members or 
sympathisers are reported to have taken part, seems to be 
increasingly permeating South African society. 
40) Southern Africa, September/October 1980. 
41) Rand Daily Mail, January 10, 1981. 
42) Ibid. 
43) Ibid. 
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Since 1976, the ANC seems to have been able to step 
up its military activity considerably. The ANC's most powerful 
blow came on June 1, 1980 when guerillas managed to sabotage 
the SASOL plant and NATREF refinery ' outside Johannesburg and 
44) the SASOL II plant at ,Secunda. Guerilla attacks have 
occurred in all parts of South Africa, a situation that could 
not have been achieved without some backing from the local 
' population. Attacks close to the South African border have 
also been increasing difficulties for white farmers there and 
45) has caused many to leave the areas under constant attack. 
Since 1977 there have been continuous trials of 
individuals accused of taking part in ANC guerilla attacks or 
in covert activity on behalf of the ANC. In May 1977, two 
youths were sentenced to eighteen months of imprisonment for 
furthering the aims of the ANC and for distributing Umkhonto 
We Siwze pamphlets. During that same period ten members in 
the Natal were accused of recruiting people for military 
training. 46 ) After the explosion of a Sowetan bomb factory 
in July 1977, in which ANC publications were found, six Africans 
. d d h P . f T . A 4 7) I were trie un er t e revention o errorism ct. n 
September of that same year, Focus reported that nine individuals 
were undergoing trial for allegedly establishing escape routes 
48) for ANC recruits to flee the country. Those accused in the 
"Pretoria 12" trial during this same period were alleged to 
have been part of a central underground structure in 
Johannesburg set up by the ANc. 49 ) After refusing to collaborate 
with the prosecution, one of the defendants exposed his per-
ception of the struggle: 
"When I joined the ANC I realized that the struggle for 
freedom would be difficult and would involve sacrifices. 
I was and I am willing to make those sacrifices. I 
appreciate the seriousness of my actions and accept 
whatever sentence may be imposed. 50) ~ 
44) Southern Africa, November/December 1980. 
45) The Guardian, September 23, 1980. 
·46) Focus, No. 10, May 1977. 
47) Focus, No. 11, July 1977. 
48) Focus, No. 12, September 1977. 
49) Ibid. 
50) Focus, No. 16, May 1978. ../20 
. - 20 -
The list of trials continues up to the present day, 
affecting people from all walks of life (e.g. teachers and 
even former policemen in 197851 )), and concerning a long list 
f , 
of different activities such as simple membership, in military 
training for or recruitment to the ANC. 
The campaign to free Nelson Mandela also attracted 
wide "grass roots" support and managed to collect a large 
number of signatures in a society in which any form of sympathy 
.for the ANC or for imprisoned ANC members can pose a danger 
for those involved. · 
"Support for the campaign came from the coloured 
community and the Natal Indian Congress, as well as 
groups of white students who held 'release Mandela' 
meetings _ at Cap 52 Jown, Pietermaritzburg and Witwatersrand." 
The ANC has bee~ in the past four years, extremely 
active in all spheres and this activity seems to have reaped 
much success. Recent events (the May attacks on police 
stations and railway lines in Durban and Johannesburg) indicate 
that ~ctivity continues and that more and more individuals are 
open to the ANC and its particular view of the struggle. The 
words of a white South African priest exiled in Zimbabwe, who 
recently announced he would join the ANC, demonstrate the 
breadth of appeal presently enjoyed by the ANC: 
"Christians in Zimbabwe, sharing with South African 
Christians can conving3)them to join the revolution in 
a whole-hearted way." . 
Almost all commentators agree that the post-Soweto 
period has seen a stark rise in the sheer amount of resistance 
inside South Africa. A recent and major United Nations General 
Assembly study on developments in S-0uth Africa says that 
''all evidence fr-0m different sources points consistently 
to major advances since 1976 in the forces of liberation 
51) Focus, Nos. 17, 19, July/November 1978. 
52) The Citizen, April 15, 1981. 
53) Ibid. 
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in the broadest sense, in terms of organization and 
unity, in terms of a growth in military capacity and 
in terms of political consciousness." 54) 
Some commentators have st a ted their assessment of 
the resistance struggle inside South Africa in even stronger 
terms. The prestigious Rockefeller Study Commission on US 
Policy Toward Southern Africa concluded in May of this year: 
"As South Africa enters the 1980s, perhaps the most 
dramatic trend in black politics is the resurgence of the 
African National Congress." 55) 
PAC 
The creation of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 
in 1959, answered the need for an 'Africanis;' theory of 
national liberation that the ANC had been, up until then, 
unable to satisfy. Africans were, and remain today, at the 
bottom of the social scale in South African society. Coloureds 
and Indians, though suffering from racial oppression under the 
apartheid regime, do not share the same objective conditions 
as Africans. Consequently, it is vital, according to the PAC, 
for all Africans to unite into one political force that alone 
will decide the path the liberation struggle will take. 
Further, it will decide upon the terms on which other ethnic 
groups may remain in South Africa. The racial minorities 
will only be permitted to remain if they accept the political, 
economic and social structures developed by Africans. 
will be no minority rights. 
There 
While the ANC accepts the thesis that Africans are 
economically and politically at the bottom of South African 
society, it differs greatly in its interpretation of this and 
its consequences for the struggle. Joe Slovo, a member of the 
SACP and ANC claims that the PAC strategy is 
54) 
55) 
"objectively liable to alienate vital potential allies 
in the struggle, to make it easier for the enemy to 
General Assembly, United Nations, Developments in South 
Africa Since the Uprisings of 1976, A/Conf. 107/3, 
20 April, 1981, p.18. 
Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, South 
Africa: Time Running Out, University of California Press, 
1981, p.202. 
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win them over as opponents of the liberation thrust. 
It ignores the very kernal of the art of political 
leadership which demands in the first place thi 
widest possible yoking of actual and potential allies, 
and the exploitation of division and weakness within 
the enemy camp; without of course, compromising the 
main direction of the struggle. An emphasis on the 
liberation of the African people does not therefore 
imply a line-up of the Africanist against the rest."56) 
The PAC though, remains in fundamental disagreement 
with the ANC's arguments, largely, for the reasons outlined 
in the sections which follow. 
"The tragedy of the South African political situation 
is that many allegedly progressive white intellectuals 
fail to outgrow the racist environment into which they 
are born and bred. As a result, they seek to infil-
trate the liberation movement in order to shape its 
policy and programme in the image of their own intel-
lectual wavering. They seek to import into the move-
ment the racist antagonism of the white man against 
the Africans. This antagonism becomes particularly 
acute when the Africans refuse to serve the private 
political interests of the 'progressive' white man.57) 
Non-Africans, all enjoying some privileges in apartheid 
society cannot objectively join the struggle in the same way 
as Africans. Whites and Indians all have a stake in apartheid 
and consequently ideal conditions for them to join the struggle 
are non-existent. Africans, on the other hand, have no stake 
in apartheid, since their only long-term interest remains its 
destruction. 
effectively. 
Only Africans can lead the liberation struggle 
In light of these arguments, the objectives of 
the PAC as outlined in its Policy and Programme are as follows: 
"To create an organizational machinery for the organiza-
tion and mobilization of the African people into a 
powerful social force bent ~pon the destruction of all 
forces and factors that have reduced their stature of 
man and retarded his growth in our country, and to 
create conditions favorable for the restoration of 
man's human worth and dignity and for the full develop-
ment of his social personality; 
56) Joe Slovo, No Middle Road, pp. 131-132. 
57) PAC in Perspective, op.cit., p.16. 
../23 
-------
- 23 -
"To establish for the liberation movement a training 
ground for the production of a determined, dedicated 
and disciplined collective leadership which will serve 
as a symbol of, and living example for, national unity 
and act as a repository, guardian and custodian of the 
ideas, principles, methods, policies and programmes of 
the movement."58) 
However, organizationally, the PAC in the last few 
years has fallen into disarray, and this has had consequences 
on all aspects of its work. The PAC has had continuous trouble 
with its leadership, and has been unable at times to integrate 
new members into its organizational structure. The expulsion 
of seven central committee members at the Arusha, Tanzania 
conference in 1978 was undertaken according to the PAC since 
these members were accused of "circulating documents which 
endanger clandestine party members, and of organizing within 
the PAC opposition to the leadership. 1159 ) The official PAC 
explanation concerning the expulsions has nevertheless not 
been accepted by all: 
"Sources close to the PAC say the expulsions are the 
latest phase of internal turmoil that was heightened 
last year (1977) by the large-scale influx into the 
party of young militant refugees from the African 
township of Soweto. The Soweto youth accuse Leballo 
and other PAC members of being out of touch with events 
in Southern Africa and of being more interested in 
holding on to their posieions than in engaging in the 
liberation struggle."60) 
The youth's call was for a change in leadership and it is 
claimed that the expulsions occurred not for reasons of in-
discipline, but for having backed the young militants' call. 
Another problem still left unresolved during the 1978 conference 
was that of who was to be named president. Leballo, the acting 
chairman of the PAC was unable to acquire enough votes to fill 
the post. Unable to decide unanimously on the person who 
should assume these responsibilities, the post remained vacant. 
58) Ibid., page 12. 
59) Africa News, July 10, 1978. 
60) Ibid. 
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In an interview given to Africa News a few weeks after 
the end of the conference, the PAC Director for Education and 
Manpower refuted the arguments that there were internal 
· . . . h . . , , 61 ) h f dissensions within t e organization. The Arus a con erence 
was able, according to him, to strengthen PAC structures within 
South Africa and that those expelled during the conference were 
only a small minority. 
Nevertheless, despite his claims, divisions within 
the PAC grew more alarming during the months that followed. 
David Sibeko, a prominent leader in the PAC, who played an 
important role in building PAC support inside South Africa, 
was assassinated in 1979. In Tanzania, six people were charged 
with the June 11 murder, and another twelve were detained for 
h f h . . . 62 ) d f h P 1 t e purpose o t e investigation. Lea ers o t e AC ater 
claimed that Sibeko was killed by three agents of the South 
African regime masquerading as freedom fighters, 63 ) but again, 
arguments to the contrary dispute these claims. The murder 
was seen by others to be aimed at eliminating the Presidential 
Council to which Sibeko was nominated, and reinstall Leballo 
to the head of the PAC. The Presidential Council, seen as a 
threat to Leballo's authority~ was to be eliminated. Whether 
these allegations are correct or not, Leballo's controversial 
role within the PAC was nevertheless existent since he was 
expelled 
Mk 64) a e. 
as chairman in late 1979, and· replaced by Visumzi 
In light of this, the problems facing the PAC 
could not be, as Potlako Leballo stated in Azania News (July/ 
August 1978), simply a question of internal contradictions 
caused by the struggle. 
"At the beginning of this year, we said that we saw the 
tasks of the struggle in 1978 as the regrouping of the 
forces of our people in order to assemble, train and 
deploy our scattered forces and fragmented movement. 
The internal contradictions of the struggle are the 
major cause of our problems, and this can be found in 
all revolutions."65) 
61) Africa News, July 31, 1978. 
62) Africa News, July 6, 1979. 
63) Daily News, February 27, 1981. 
64) Southern Africa, November/December 1979. 
65) Azania News, July/August 1978. • • I 25 
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The continuing crisis within the PAC had an effect on 
the Organization of African Unity Conference in 1979. Whereas 
the year before, the question of AN~/PAC unity had been raised, 
. . . d 66 ) Th Ch. in 1979 the question was not even mentione. e airman 
of the PAC presidential council, Vusi Make, stated that two 
factions were at war, and that gangsterism and gross indiscipline 
were rife within the movement. Additionally, some commentators 
pointed out that Sibeko's funeral in Botswana failed to attract 
large crowds. This, they interpreted as a clear sign of loss 
of support for the PAC. New African magazine claimed in 
September that these facts were: 
"likely to strengthen the group in the OAU that thinks 
the ANC only should be recognized - among countries 
favouring exclusive ANC recognition are Angola, 
Mozambique, Zambia, Algeria, Benin, Ethiopia, Guinea-
Bissau and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Furthermore, countries like Swaziland and Lesotho now 
appear to support this position after they detained 
PAC exiles - allegedly because they were interfering 
in the internal affairs of their host countries."67) 
Continuously, there is intense internal discussion 
within the Tanzanian Government about de-recognition of the 
PAC. A memorandum dated 26.9.1979 circulated within the 
Tanzanian Foreign Affairs Ministry stated that Tanzania should 
de-recognize the PAC but that if it did so "it (Tanzania) would 
be in a very awkward position because ·so many other African 
States have stopped recognizing the PAC and therefore the 
Tanzanian Government would have no place to send all the PAC 
people." Tanzanian security officials believe that P.K. Leballo, 
the recently ousted PAC chairman, is an agent of the South 
African and Amin Governments. There is a continuing concern 
that the PAC is greatly infiltrated. This concern is so serious 
that a 1979 memorandum from the President's office suggested 
preventing all PAC members from coming to Tanzania. 
66) New African, September 1979. 
67) Ibid. 
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In this period of turmoil within the PAC, it is 
difficult to find any evidence of activity actually undertaken 
against the white supremacist regime. The main, if not only, 
major activity undertaken by the Pt c since the Soweto uprisings 
within South Africa was led by those accused in the Bethal 18 
trial of trying to overthrow the South African government. 68 ) 
This trial, held for 18 ~onths baginning in January 1978, was 
· for activities conducted by the accused in 1976 and 1977. 
Additionally, there is the fact that 23 more PAC guerillas 
~ere caught in northern South Africa in late ·1978, the Justice 
Minister, Kruger said: 
"that there were indications that 78 recruits were 
being trained in China, but as far as he knew, the 
PAC was falling into decline."69) 
The Bethal trial further reinforced Kruger's statement as it 
was a serious setback for the PAC's South African underground 
network. It has also been reported that China seems to be 
increasingly reluctant to give the PAC continued support. 70 } 
If this is correct, the PAC is far from having resolved the 
problems that have continuously beset it. 
"In recent years the PAC, though recognized along with 
the ANC by the Organization of African Unity as one 
of South Africa's historic liberation movements, has 
been beset by internal rivalries. For this reason, 
among others, it has increasi~gly been ~clipsed by the 
ANC which is regarded by most observers as having more 
coherent ideology and organization and a broader range 
of support in South Africa and overseas."71) 
Despite the rather poor record of activity and unity 
of the PAC since 1978, various changes have occured and seem 
to provide grounds for believing that the PAC may be beginning 
to overcome its internal prdblems. 
At the Central Committee extra-ordinary session in 
Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, held in February 1981, various measures 
68) Focus, March 1978. 
69) Southern Africa, January 1979. 
· 70) Africa Confidential, January 28, 1981. 
71) Africa News, March 1981. 
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were adopted to reestablish the PAC as a viable liberation 
movement. Nyati Pokela, a PAC leader formerly imprisoned on 
Robbe~Island, and said to be capa~le of uniting the PAC 
forces, managed to flee South Africa and was quickly promoted 
to the role of Chairman of the PAC. This nomination could make 
the PAC's problems a thing of the past. 72) Since his nominati"on, 
Pokela has stressed the need fo~ unity and has set forth on .a 
campaign to explain clearly what the policies of the PAC really 
are. The Central Committee meeting also called for all those 
who were expelled in 1978 to rejoin the PAC. 
In mid-June this year, the PAC members accused of 
killing David Sibeko were found guilty of manslaughter and 
were sentenced to 15 years each. The Tanzanian High Court 
judges stated that they did not believe there had ever been 
an "internal plot to eliminate the leadership of the PAC". 
Nor did they believe that Vusumzi Make, who had hidden in the 
closet during the shooting, was in any way involved. Generally, 
in spite of inconsistencies between statements to the police 
and testimony in the court, Make's testimony was found credible. 
Finally, the High Court determined that "the shooting was an 
act of the highest degree of recklessness." 
A PAC press release 73 ) demonstrates the high hopes 
the organization has with the nomination of Pokela as chairman: 
"Today the PAC is proud to announce that in a short 
period of one month since the arrival of comrade Pokela, 
major steps have been taken to unite the PAC abroad. 
In concrete terms, we announce the unconditional return 
to the fold of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 
of seventy-two comrades expelled in Arusha, Tanzania, 
in July 1978. The return · of these comrades heralds a 
major step along the path of uniting the PAC, con-
solidating it internally and strengtheningits organ-
izational and revolutionary potentials. Their uncon-
ditional return, moreover, is concrete proof that 
comrade Pokela has achieved significant success, in a 
very short period, in fulfilling his mission."74) 
72) Africa News, March 1981. 
73) March 19, 1981. 
74) Azania Co~tact, March 1981. 
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These claims of the PAC are reflected in press reports 
.d . ·175) worldwi e. The Rand Daily Mai covered the conference, and 
stated that the bid to regroup began with the expulsion of 
Leballo as chairman in 1979, and is'' continuing with the newly 
appointed· chairman Pokela. Africa News 76 ) also states that 
Pokela had been close to Sobukwe, the PAC's first leader and 
major ideological source who died in 1978. This, Africa News 
, argued, would perhaps help bring about the changes needed. 
Despite these modifications, various problems still 
continue to tarnish the PAC's image. Questions raised in the 
trial for the murder of Sibeko continue. It is also far from 
clear how deep dissent has permeated the structure of the 
organization. Additionally, changes under the Pokela leader-
ship are far too fresh to be able to determine whether they 
will be of significance and manage to build support internally 
and internationally. All in all, it remains problematic 
whether the new developments will enable the PAC to become a 
liberation movement capable of fighting the apartheid regime 
of South Africa. 
* * * * * * * * * 
75) March 27, 19el 
76) March 30, 1981. 
